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1. Introduction 
It is difficult to imagine a less likely subject than the one suggested by 
the title of this article. On one hand, philosophers may fail to see the connection 
between philosophical reflection and a building. Not that philosophy, particularly 
in its existentialist traditions, would shrink from reflecting on a building; 
after all, buildings are part of the reality philosophy studies. Yet, philosophers 
are not likely to relate the issue of philosophical foundations to the idea of 
building or to any concrete building. On the other hand, classical and modern 
theologians may wonder whether philosophical foundations are involved 
in the study of the biblical sanctuary. Even theologians studying the biblical 
text may find it difficult to see how philosophical foundations relate to the 
sanctuary depicted in the OT and NT. In short, the very connection this 
title suggests may appear problematic to most theologians and philosophers. 
The purpose of this essay is to explore the way in which philosophical 
foundations relate to the theological interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. 
Specifically, the connection between philosophical foundations and biblical 
sanctuary will be explored in order to assess their role in the theological understan& 
ing of the biblical sanctuary motif. 
I have organized this essay in six sections. Following this (1) introduction, 
(2) I will identdy the connection between sanctuary and philosophical foundations 
and describe its nature. Immediately thereafter, (3) a brief reference to the 
nature of philosophical principles, their functions, and their classical and 
postmodern interpretations will be presented. Then, I will explore the way 
in which (4) classical and (5) modern foundations relate to the sanctuary. 
In the final section (6) I will ponder the question of philosophical foundations 
inherent in the sanctuary. 
2. l%e Nutwe of the Connection 
The connection between sanctuary and philosophical principles comes 
into view in Exod 25:8. In this passage God requests the building of the Israelite 
sanctuary. God tells Moses: 'Have them [Israelites] make a sanctuary for 
me, that I may dwell among them." From the perspective of this pivotal 
text the sanctuary [miqdas'l1 appears as a building where God plans to dwell 
[iukan] among human beings [btokam]. Thus, the idea of sanctuary is not 
reduced to a building but emerges as a God-building-human-beings structure. 
This structure brings into view the inner connection that exists between 
sanctuary and philosophical foundations. The connection takes place through 
the ideas of God and human nature which are essentially involved in the 
notion of sanctuary. 
Since early times, the study of philosophical foundations has been known 
under the general label of metaphysics. According to Aristotle, metaphysics 
studies the meaning of first principles of scientific knowledge.2 To recognize 
that among generally accepted philosophical foundations we find the notions 
of human nature,) nature (the world) ,' Gody5 and Being6 will suffice for the 
'In his study of sanctuary terms in Exod 25-40, Ralph E. Hendrix reports that "miqdaj 
(holy precinct), and by i t  (house) in reference to the divine dwelling, each occurs only once, 
in Exod 25:8 and 34b:26 respectively" CThe Use of Mijkan and 'Ohel Mo id in Exod 25-40," 
Andrews University Seminary Studies 30 [1992]: 5, n. 5). In these chapters two other words 
are used consistently to refer to the sanctuary. Concluding his word study, Hendrix suggests 
"that mishn is used in constructional contexts, primarily associated with commands to 
manufacture and assemble the Dwelling Place of YHWH, but secondarily in its generic sense 
as simply 'dwelling place.' The phrase bhel moid appears in literary contexts where the 
cultic function of the habitation is the concern" (ibid., 13). In a more theological note he 
adds that "in all contexts within Exod 2110 the biblical writer has masterfully controlled 
the use of mishn and ?&el mo id in order to clarlfy the dual nature of YHWH's habitation. 
That habitation was to be understood as a transient dwelling place, such as was consistent 
with the dwelling places of nomadic peoples; therefore the choice of miikan. But yet, that 
habitation also had the continuing function of fostering the cultic relationship, and this 
aspect was best expressed by the choice of %el mo 8' (ibid.). The variety in the use of words 
to describe the sanctuary contributes to underline its God-building-beings structure. In this 
article I am not addressing the complexity of the structure. The purpose of the essay only 
requires its identification. However, we should notice that the "bui1ding"component does 
not play a mediatorial role between God and human beings, but situates and articulates their 
relationships in space and time. 
'Aristotle Metaphysics 1. 1-2, 981b26-983a11. Aristotle describes the science we call 
metaphysics as the study "that investigates the first principles and causes" (ibid., 1.2,982b9). 
'Martin Heidegger underlines the role of human nature as principle of interpretation 
of reality (ontology) (Being and Time, trans. by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson 
[New York: Harper and Collins, 1962],62). 
'Aristotle recognized that our understanding of the world is a principle of science. If 
it were not by the existence of the science of God (theology), the science of the world would 
limited purpose of this essay. Among philosophical foundations, Being is 
the last and grounding one beyond or besides which there is no other. Due 
to this unsurpassable universality, the notion of Being determines the general 
nature of reality of which human nature, world, and God are regional aspects. 
The meaning of Being, then, determines the general meaning of reality to 
which any specific reality belongs. 
Once first principles are interpreted by philosophy, they become grounding 
hermeneutical principles for anY science of r e a l i  
of Being provides the hermeneutical principle necessary to interpret human 
nature, world, and God. Philosophical clarification on the general meaning 
of these areas, in turn, becomes directly involved as hermeneutical principles 
for the sciences of human nature (humanities), the world (the so-called factual 
sciences), and God (theology). Christian theologians should be aware that 
these principles are scientific in mode; that is to say, they come into play 
whenever we approach the study of reality technically. The same hermeneutid 
p~ciples,  however, are operative in everyday discourse, though in an implicit 
prescientific mode.' 
qualify as fist philosophical principle (Metupbyszcs, 6.1,1026a27-29). 
5Philosophically speaking, the ideas of God and human nature are subject matters 
studied by regional ontologies. Thus, the ontological study of God, the world, and human 
nature quahfy as philosophrcal foundations. Aristotle considered that "if there is an 
immovable substance [God], the science of this must be prior [to the science of nature] and 
must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first" (Mmapbysia, 6.1, 
102629). 
6Regional ontologies are not the first foundation of philosophy. They rest on the 
overall view of reality interpreted by general ontology. General ontology has traditionally 
addressed the common characteristics or traits of Being as they refer to beings (ibid., 4.1, 
100322). Among them, for instance, we f i d  the ideas of matter and form and potency and 
act (ibid., 5.18, 1022a14-19; 4.6,1048a351048b9). Finally, regional and general ontologies 
spring from the discussion of what Martin Heidegger called "foundational ontology." 
Foundational ontology studies "the question of the meaning of Being in general" (Being and 
Time 31, 61). We should avoid confusing or fusing the God principle with the Being 
principle. In his later writings Heidegger calls the concept of Beiig to play the role that is 
usually played by the concept of God or the concept of the One. This usage not only 
replaces the God principle but also involves panentheism. For this reason, we should avoid 
mixing the God principle (the One) with the Being principle (the universal notion of Being) 
as Heidegger seems to do. On the contrary, we should understand the formal defiition of 
the Being principle as playing a role in the epistemological realm as in Aristotle's analogical 
understanding of Being. 
'Hans-Georg Gadamer describes the universality of hermeneutics by showing that 
everyday experience necessarily involves bias or prejudice. He has clearly underlined that 
our experience in its prescientific mode also involves principles; presuppositions; or, as he 
points out in the following statement, prejudices: '7t can be shown that the concept of 
prejudice did not originally have the meaning we have attached to it. Prejudices are not 
The interpretation of the meaning of the bi- as a Goctbuilding- 
human-beings structure directly assumes a previous preunderstanding (philo- 
sophical principles or presuppositions) of God, human beings, and the world. 
Indirectly, however, it also requires a pre~nderstandin~ on the meaning of 
Being. Consequently, any exegesis of the biblical data on the sanctuary and 
their theological interpretation assumes the foundational hermeneutical role 
played by these principles. 
3. Classical versus Postmodern Understanding of Being 
Within the scientific mode of reflection, philosophical presuppositions 
stem from the interpretation of the first principle or ultimate presupposition, 
namely, the implicit or explicit meaning of Being. A cursory description 
of the two meanings in which the concept of Being has been understood 
in Western thought will suffice to our purpose.8 
Aristotle understood the science of Being as the science of the universal 
which lays the ground and unity for all other sciences, including theology.9 
Aristotle did not explicitly reflect on Being per se. He assumed the epoch-making 
view of Parmenides, who advanced a timeless interpretation.1° Plato, embracing 
Parmenides' view that Being-reality as such-was of a timeless nonhistorical 
nature, conceived a bipolar interpretation of beings as a whole (metaphysics). 
This bipolar interpretation of reality is known as the two-world theory, 
necessarily unjustified and erroneous, so that they inevitably distort the truth. I .  fact, the 
historicity of our existence entails that prejudices, in the literal sense of the word, constitute 
the initial directedness of our whole ability to experience. Prejudices are biases of our 
openness to the world. They are simply conditions whereby we experience 
something-whereby what we encounter says something to usn ("The Universality of the 
Hermeneutical Problem," in Philosophical Hermeneutics, ed. and trans. David E. Linge 
[Berkeley, CA: University of Califorina Press, 1976],9). Bias and prejudice include all our 
accumulated personal experiences. The first principles of philosophy are biases or prejudices 
we implicitly assume in everyday &course regardmg Being, God, world, and human nature. 
Philosophical principles are the explicit and sophisticated definition of the meaning of Being, 
God, world, and human nature that determine the task of interpretation in all scientific 
enterprise. 
"For a detailed description of these two interpretations of Being, see my A Criticism 
of Theological Reason: Time and Tinelessness as Primordial Presuppositions (Berrien Springs, 
MI: Andrews University Press, 1987), 66-130. 
1°"Being has no corning-into-being and no destruction, for it is whole of limb, without 
motion, and without end. And it never Was, nor Will Be, because it Is now, a Whole all 
together, One, continuous" (Parmenides, Fragments 6,7, in Kathleen Freeman, Ancilfa to 
the Pre-Socratic Philosophers: A Complete Translation of the Fragments in Diels, Fragmente der 
Vorsokratikw [Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1948],43). 
which involves the intelligible and visible orders." The heavenly-intelligible 
order is timeless and eternal, while the earthly-sensible order is temporal 
and moving." 
From Parmenides' intuition of the meaning of Being (foundational ontology), 
the interpretation of general ontology implicit in bipolar metaphysics, and 
Aristotle's conception of the science of first principles, the universality and 
absolute certainty that characterized the classical and modern minds came 
to shape the destiny of Western civilization. This frame of mind decided 
the scientific structure of Christian theology soon after the NT was written 
and has continued to be the foundation on which it is still constructed. As 
we will see later, the Platonic-Aristotelian understanding of the first philo- 
sophical principles has played a foundational herrneneutid role in the theological 
interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. 
The relentless criticism of tradition that characterizes the postmodern 
mind has made possible an epochal change in the interpretation of the general 
nature of ultimate reality. I am referring to the switch from the classical and 
modern understanding of Being as timeless (as, for instance, in Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine, Aquinas, Luther, Calvin, Descartes, Kant, Hegel, Whitehead, 
Barth, and Pannenberg) to its temporal interpretation in postmodernism. 
This change was anticipated by Nietzsche and articulatedlater in technical 
detail by Heidegger. In his opening statements in Being and lime, Heidegger 
gave explicit expression to this new understanding of reality: "Our aim in 
the following treatise is to work out the question of the meaning of Being 
and to do so concretely. Our provisional aim is the Interpretation of time 
as the possible horizon for any understanding whatsoever of Being."" The 
postmodern search for truth, therefore, presupposes a radically different 
concept of the ground on which reality as a whole is understood This primordial 
presupposition affects not only philosophy, but also the whole scientific 
enterprise, including of course, C b  theology. As a matter of fact, Heidegger's 
interpretation of the Being principle as temporality has already unleashed 
"Plato summarizes his "two worldsn theory in his Republic 6,509d-511e. 
"Translated by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson (New York: Harper and 
Collins, 1962), 1. In the same general line of thought, Jean-Paul Sartre affirmed the "monism 
of the phenomenon," which departs from the classical and modern dualism between 
appearance and reality. According to Sartre, then, "the dualism of being and appearance is 
no longer entitled to any legal status within philosophy. The appearance refers to the total 
series of appearances and not to a hidden reality which would drain to itself all the bang of 
the existent. This appearance, for its part, is not an inconsistent manifestation of this beingn 
(Being and Nothingness: An Essay on Phenomenological Ontology, trans. with introduction 
by Hazel E. Barnes [New York: Philosophical Library, 19561, xlv). 
a theological revisionism of the God principle.14 
Early in the third millennium Christian theologians will face the fact 
that during the twentieth century Western philosophy made the mom radical 
turnabout since the days of Parmenides, Plato, and Aristotle. Some sectors 
of Christianity, building their theological perspectives on the philosophical 
foundations of classical and modern philosophy, will have a harder time 
dealing with this foundational intellectual change than Christian theologians 
attempting to develop Christian theology based on the Protestant solasrriptua 
principle. In other words, the temporal understanding of Being calls for a 
deconstruction of Christian theology and its timeless conception of Being 
and God. The corresponding constructive phase and its repercussion in the 
task of doing Christian theology must wait for a more propitious time. Here 
we need only to show some examples of the way in which the classical and 
modem understan* of philmphical principles relate to the biblical sanctuary 
and what new ways the temporal-historical understanding of Being opens 
for the interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. 
4. Sanctuury and Classical Foundations 
In this section, my purpose is to show how classical interpretations 
of the sanctuary result from either explicitly or implicitly acquiescing to 
Platonic and/or Aristotelian philosophical foundations. As described in section 
2, fm philosophical principles include the Being, God, human nature, and 
world principles. For the purpose of this essay I will concentrate on the God 
principle, which in turn assumes the Being principle and the nature (world) 
principle.15 In the God-building-beings structure of the sanctuary, the former 
relates to God and the latter to the building. In short, I will concentrate 
on the notions of God and/or nature (worl4 and their influence on the theological 
interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. For my purpose, I have surveyed 
"Among these attempts we find John Macquarrie's identification of the God and Being 
principles (Pn'nciples of Christian Theology [New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 19661, 115- 
122). Thus God becomes assimilated to the generality proper to Being and therefore is 
depersonalized. McQuarrie explains: "If we understand god as being, the relation is that of 
being to the beings rather that [sic] one being to another" (ibid., 121). Schubert Ogden has 
proposed a temporal understanding of God based on an analogy with Heidegger's notion 
of human temporality (The Reality of God and Other Essays [New York: Harper and Row, 
19661,144-163). For a summary of these and other ways of dealing with God's temporality 
stemming from Process Philosophy, see William J. Hill, Searchfor the Absent God- Tradition 
and Modernity in Religious Understanding (New York: Crossroad, 1992), 80-91. 
l5 Throughout most of the history of Western philosophy and Christian theology, the 
question of the meaning of Being has remained implicit in the interpretation of the God 
principle. Explicit inquiry into the meaning of Being has taken place only recently in the 
writings of Heidegger. 
the way Philo, Aquinas, and Calvin deal with the biblical sanctuary motif 
because they are influential representatives of the classical approach. 
Philo of Alexandria (40/30B. C - A. D. 40/50) 
Philo is the most notable philosopher of Alexandrian Judaism. His syncretic 
approach juxtaposedPlatonic, Stoic, Pythagorean, and Aristotelian elements. 
His reinterpretation of Platonism provided a metaphysical framework that, 
with few variations, was adopted by all forms of Neoplatonism and became 
influential until Sch~lasticisrn.~~ Regarding the God principle, Philo follows 
classical Greek philosophy by adopting the timelessness interpretation of 
God's being.17 Consequently, God relates to creation The nature 
(world) principle unfolds in harmony with the God principle. Philo interprets 
the nature p r i ip l e  as following the two orders or levels of Platonic ontology. 
In creation (the nature principle), Philo sees two orders or realms: the intelligible 
and sensible universes.19 Moreover, he places the intelligible universe in the 
Logos, a subalternate duplication of God.20 The intelligible world, then, is 
not only timeless but also spaceless. 
The nature principle causes Philo to understand the sanctuary as a symbolic 
representation of the intelligible and sensible orders.21 Moreover, the God 
16Guillermo Fraile, Historia deh  Filosofi, 3 vols. Madrid: B.A.C., 1965,1966), 1:697. 
""But God is the maker of time also, for He is the father of time's father, that is of the 
universe, and has caused the movements of the one to be the source of the generation of the 
other. Thus time stands to God in the relation of a grandson. For this universe, since we 
perceive it by our senses, is the younger son of God. To the elder son, I mean the intelligible 
universe, He assigned the place of firstborn, and purposed that it should remain in His own 
keeping. So this younger son, the world of our sense, when set in motion, brought that 
entity we call time to the brightness of its rising. And thus with God there is no future, since 
He has made the boundaries of the ages subject to Himself. For God's life is not a time, but 
eternity, which is the archetype and pattern of time; and in eternity there is no past nor 
future, but only present existence" (Philo Quod Deus immutabilis sit, LCL, 31-32). 
18"So shall they [those prone to follow old fables] be schooled to understand that with 
Him nothing is ancient, nothing at all past, but all is in its birth and existence timeless 
(achron~s)" (Philo De Sacrt$ciis Abelis et Caini, LCL, 76). 
19"When He [God] willed to create this visible world He first fully formed the 
intelligible world, in order that He might have the use of a pattern wholly God-like and 
incorporeal in producing the material world, as a later creation, the very image of an earlier, 
to embrace in itself objects of perception of as many kinds as the other contained objects of 
intelligence" (De Opificio Mundi, LCL, 4. 16). See also, Quod Deus immutabilis sit, 31-32. 
''Philo explicitly underlines that "to speak of or conceive that world which consists of 
ideas as being in some place is illegitimate" (De opificio mundi, 4. 17). Because of its nature 
"the universe that consisted of ideas would have no other location than the Divine Reason, 
which was the Author of the ordered frame" (ibid., 5.20). 
"It seems that Philo understands the most holy place as including symbols of the 
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principle leads him to an allegorical interpretation of Exod 25:8. What is 
the meaning of God's intention to dwell in the tabernacle? Philo dismisses 
the literal meaning in favor of a "deeper"one; that is, he interprets the text 
as talking about God's dwelling in the sensible world." Specifically, Philo 
says that God dwells in the world when the soulZ3has an intellectual glimpse 
of his intellectual manifestationd4 According to the interpretation 
of the God principle Philo adopts, God cannot dwell in the space-temporal 
continuum of the OT tent. The allegorical interpretation is the process through 
which the literal meaning of the text is deconstructed and reconstructed 
in harmony with the dictates of the God principle. In Philo's allegorical 
interpretation, the God-building-being sanctuary structure is translated into 
a God-being structure taking place within the intellectual, nonhistorical side 
of reality. The philosophical principles Philo embraces call for a herme- 
neutical, deconstructive dismissal of the literal historical sense of sanctuary 
texts in favor of an imaginative speculative construction of an alleged "deeper" 
intellectual nonhistorical allegorical meaning. 
Aquinas follows the same overall interpretation of Philo's God principle. 
-- 
intelligible world, while the holy place refers symbolically to the sensible order. 
Commenting on Exod 25:22, Philo opens his interpretation of the table in the holy place by 
noticing that "having spoken symbolically of incorporeal things, when He was &coursing 
divinely about the ark in the inner sanctuary, He now begins to speak of those things which 
are in sense-perception, rightly and appropriately beginning with the table" (Questions et 
Solutions in Exodus, LCL, 2.69). In more detail, Philo explains that "the highest, and in the 
truest sense the holy, temple of God is, as we must believe, the whole universe, having for 
its sanctuary the most sacred part of all existence, even heaven, for its votive ornaments the 
stars, for its priests the angels who are servitors to His powers, unbodied souls, not 
compounds of rational and irrational nature, as we are, but with the irrational eliminated, 
all mind through and through, pure intelligences, in the likeness of the monad. There is also 
the temple made by hands; for it was right that no check should be given to the forwardness 
of those who pay their tribute to piety and desire by means of sacrifices either to give thanks 
for the blessings that befall them or to ask for pardon and forgiveness for their sins" (De 
Specialibus Legibus, LCL, 1. 66). 
Ybid. 2.51; cf. De Pkzntatione 12.50. 
nHere Philo brings the anthropological principle to play a significant role in the 
interpretation of the sanctuary. 
24uThen will appear to thee that manifest One, Who causes incorporeal rays to shine 
for thee and grants visions of the unambiguous and indescribable things of nature and the 
abundant sources of other good things. For the beginning and end of happiness is to be able 
to see God. But this cannot happen to him who has not made his soul, as I said before, a 
sanctuary and altogether a shrine of God" (Questions et Solutions in Exodus 2.51). 
PHILOSOPHICAL FOUNDATIONS AND THE BIBLICAL SANCTUARY 19 1 
According to Aquinas, God is and eternity is timeless because in 
it there is no temporal s~ccession.~~ Regarding the nature (world) principle, 
Aquinas abandons the Neoplatonic tradition in favor of a modif Aristotelian 
understanding. However, Plato's tweworld theory is still operative in Aquinas's 
view, not as separate universes, but as always present components of the 
unified hierarchical universal order of reality (nature/world) .' The nature 
(world) principle finds its ontological ground in the intellectual component 
of reality that Aquinas conceives in analogy to the timelessness of the God 
principle. In other words, Aquinas still conceives the real reality of the world 
as belonging to the invisible nature of the intellect. Despite Aristotle's and 
Aquinas' attempts at overcoming Platonic dualism, the visible historical 
side of reality remains a lesser and dependent level of reality. 
The great systematizer of Roman Catholic theology provides, as usual, 
a clear synthesis of the general way in which theologians understood the 
biblical sanctuary until the thirteenth century. Because God is incorporeal 
while humans are corporeal (principle of nature), God cannot dwell in the 
sanctuary, as Exod 25:8 clearly statesa Consequently, the God-building-beings 
structure is deconstructed and reconstructed as a God-beings intellectual 
relation of spiritual worship. God did not need the sanctuary for himself 
or for his work of salvation. God willed the O T  sanctuary for two reasons 
that relate to humans. On the practical side, the sanctuary was needed for 
worship and, on the theological side, for the prefiguration of Christ.29 
Aquinas also has ametaphorical understanding of biblical language on 
25Summa Theologiae 1.10.2. 
''Summa Theologiue 1.10.1 and 4. 
"Aquinas developed his understanding of this principle in the brief booklet On Being 
and Essence, trans. and notes, Armand Maurer (Toronto: Pontificial Institute of Medieval 
Studies, 1949). 
28"From this [I Kgs 8: 27,29,30] it is evident that the house of the sanctuary was set up, 
not in order to contain God, as abidmg therein locally, but that God's name might dwell 
there, i.e., that God might be made known there by means of things done and said there; and 
that those who prayed there might, through reverence for the place, pray more devoutly, 
so as to be heard more readily" (Summa Theologiue la-lae. 102.4. obj. 1). 
''Summa Theologiae, la-2ae. 102.3. "The divine worship regards two things: namely, 
God Who is worshiped; and men, who worship Him. Accordingly God, Who is worshiped, 
is confined to no bodily place: wherefore there was no need, on His part, for a tabernacle 
or temple to be set up. But men, who worship Him, are corporeal beings: and for their sake 
there was need for a special tabernacle or temple to be set up for the worship of God, for 
two reasons. First, that through coming together with the thought that the place was set 
aside for the worship of God, they might approach thither with greater reverence. Secondly, 
that certain things relating to the excellence of Christ's Divine or human nature might be 
signified by the arrangement of various details in such temple or tabernacle" (Summa 
Theologiue la-2%. 102.4 obj. 1). 
heavenly sanctuary texts?' The reason for the metaphorical understanding 
of the heavenly sanctuary is the consistent application of the God and nature 
principles. Since Christ (simultaneously being God and glorif~ed human nature) 
asmnded above all corporeal heavens" where there is no place, biblical statements 
placing God in a heavenly sanctuary must be read metaPhoricallyP Conversely, 
texts placing God above the heavens (where there is neither time nor place) 
can be interpreted literally.)3 Heavenly sanctuary (priesthood) language is 
a metaphor pointing to divine being and action. For instance, Christ's sitting 
at the nght hand of the Father "in the heavenly realmsn (Eph k20) metaphorically 
signifies (1) the glory of the Godhead, (2) the beatitude of the Father, and 
'The study of the nature and function of metaphor in human discourse and theology 
is very complex. For the limited purposes of this article I will use the notion of metaphor 
as those utterances functioning "in two referential fields at once. This duality explains how 
two levels of meaning are linked together in the symbol. The first meaning relates to a 
known field of reference, that is to the sphere of entities to which the predicates considered 
in their established meaning can be attached. The second meaning, the one that is to be made 
apparent, relates to a referential field for which there is no h e c t  characterization, for which 
we consequently are unable to make identdying descriptions by means of appropriate 
predicates" (Paul Ricoeur, fie Ruk ofMefaphor: Multi-disciplinury Studies ofthe Creation of 
Meaning in Language, trans. Robert Czerny with Kathleen McLaughlin and John Costello 
[Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1977J 299). "Most simply, Sallie McFague explains: 
a metaphor is seeing one thing as something else, pretending 'this' is 'that' as a way of saying 
something about it. Thinking metaphorically means spotting a thread of similarity between 
two dissimilar objects, events, or whatever, one of which is better known than the other, and 
using the better-known one as a way of speaking about the lesser known" (Metaphorical 
Theology: Models of God in Religious Language [Philadelphia: Fortress, 19821, 15). In this 
broad sense, the notion of metaphor overlaps the ideas of symbol and figurative language (cf. 
Ricoeur, Interpretation Theory: Discourse and the Sutplus of Meaning port  Worth: Texas 
Christian University Press, 19761, 4569; McFague, 10-14). From these descriptions, it 
follows that when we read a text metaphorically, we assume the meaning of its subject- 
matter or referent. As I will argue in the following pages, Christian interpretations of OT 
and NT sanctuaries usually flow from the philosophical interpretation of the God principle 
used to decide the metaphorical nature of the texts, thereby opening the meaning of the texts 
to the free play of the creative imagination of the reader. Of course, metaphors do not 
require timeless transcendence as referent. Metaphors do play a cognitive illuminative role 
in common discourse referring to the Lebenswelt (cf. Anthony C. Thiselton, New Horizons 
in Hermeneutics: The Theory and Practice of Transforming Biblical Reading [Grand Rapids: 
Zondervan, 19921,351-358). 
"Aquinas recognizes the existence of seven corporeal heavens. However, when applied 
to God, he understands heaven metaphorically (Summa Theologiae 1.68.4). 
"As, for instance, "The Lord is in his holy temple; the Lord is on his heavenly throne" 
(Ps 11 A); 6. Summd Theologiae 3.57.4. 
33For instance, "He who descended is the very one who ascended higher than all the 
heavens in order to fill the whole universe" (Eph 4:10 and Ps 8:2). Cf. Summa Theologiae 
3.57.4, and obj. 1-2. 
(3) j~diciarypower.~ Here the biblical notion of sanctuary and its God-building- 
beings structure is deconstructed to a God-only referent. 
John C;zlvin (1 509-1 564) 
Protestantism made Scripture play a greater role in its theological for- 
mula t ion~~~ than Roman Catholicism had during the scholastic period. Even 
though Calvin's theological synthesis closely follows biblical language, the 
God and nature principles mill rest on the classical understanding of God's 
timeless eterni$6 and spacial ubiquitousness." The latter involves the notions 
that 'no place can be assigned to God" and that 'his presence, not confined 
to any region, is diffused over all ~pace."'~ Heaven, therefore, is not a place 
where God lives, acts, and enters into relationship with his creatures, but 
is a metaphor for God's ineffable glory.39 
Following in Philo's and Aquinas' paths, Calvin understood the OT 
sanctuary as a twofold metaphor facilitating real worship4' and pointing 
%mmu Theologize 3.58.2.. 
35Jaroslav Pelikan, The Christian Tradition: A History of the Development of Doctrine 
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1971-1989), 4:118-119. 
361nstitutes of the Christian Religion 1.13.7-8; 14.3. 
38Comrnenting on the Lord's Prayer statement, "Our Father which art in heaven," 
Calvin asserts, on the basis of 1 Kgs 8:27 and Isa 66:1, "that his [God's] presence, not 
confined to any region, is diffused over all space." From this basis Calvin immediately 
asserts that "as our gross minds are unable to conceive of his ineffable glory, it is designated 
to us by heaven, nothing which our eyes can behold being so full of splendor and majesty. 
While, then, we are accustomed to regard every object as confined to the place where our 
senses discern it, no place can be assigned to God; and hence, if we would seek him, we must 
rise,higher than all corporeal or mental discernment. Again, this form of expression reminds 
us that he is far beyond the reach of change or corruption, that he holds the whole universe 
in his grasp, and rules it by his power." On this ground, Calvin interprets the Lord's prayer 
statement "Our Father which art in heaven" metaphorically because the God principle, not 
allowing God the ontological capacity of being in time or a place, demands a metaphorical, 
figurative sense. Thus, the text cannot mean what it says regarding place. Calvin assures us 
that the meaning of the text is "the same as if it had been said, that he is of infinite majesty, 
incomprehensible essence, boundless power, and eternal duration. When we thus speak of 
God, our thoughts must be raised to hear the highest pitch, we must not measure him by 
our little standards, or suppose his will to be like ours" (Institutes 3.20.40). 
"Commenting on God's command, "let them make me a sanctuary," Calvin warns that 
"we must beware of imagining anything inconsistent with the nature of God [the God 
principle], for He who sits above the heavens, and whose footstool is the earth, could not 
be enclosed in the tabernacle; but, because in His indulgence for the infirmities of an 
ignorant people, He desired to testlfy the presence of His grace and help by a visible symbol, 
to Christ." The heavenly sanctuary, likewise, becomes a metaphor for the 
spiritual efficacy that emanates from Christ's spiritual body (the real sanctuary) 
to 
Calvin's hermeneutical principles (God and nature principles) demand 
that sanctuary texts be understood as metaphors for true worship and the 
eternal efficacy of Christ's salvation for us. By the application of philosophical 
principles originating in classical Greek philosophy, the God-building-beings 
sanctuary structure of the biblical texts becomes reconstructed as the God 
[Christ]-beings pattern of theological discourse. 
The cases included in t h s  section have been few and cursorily addressed. 
However, they may help us to see how the philosophical foundations of 
theology become hermeneutical principles guiding the interpretation of the 
biblical sanctuary motif. Philo, Aquinas, and Calvin, belonging to 
widely diverse theological traditions, yet work within the same Platonic- 
Aristotelian interpretation of the God and nature principles. These principles 
have hermene~ticall~ determined their reading of the O T  and NT texts 
on the sanctuary. The timeless, spaceless interpretation of the God principle, 
unable to fit the temporal spatial meaning of the texts, calls for allegorical, 
-- - 
the earthly sanctuary is called His dwelhg amongst men, inasmuch as there He was not 
worshiped in vain. And we must bear in memory what we have lately seen, that it was not 
the infinite essence of God, but His name, or the record of His name, that dwelt there" 
(Commentaries on the Four Books of Moses Arranged in the Form of a Harmony, trans. C. 
William Bingham [Grand Rapids: Eerdrnans, 1950],4: 150). 
""When we would seek the body or substance of the ancient shadows, and the truth 
of the figures, we may learn them, not only from the Apostle, but also from the Prophets, 
who everywhere draw the attention of believers to the kingdom of Christ; yet their clearer 
explanation must be sought in the Gospel, where Christ, the Sun of Righteousness, shining 
forth, shows that their fulfilment exists in Himself alone. But, although by His coming He 
abolished these typical ceremonies as regards their use, yet at the same time He established 
the reverence justly due to them; since they have no claim to be held in esteem on any other 
ground, except that their completion is found in Him; for, if they are separated from Him, 
it is plain that they are mere farces" (ibid., 154). 
"Commenting on Heb 9:11, Calvin assures us that he has no doubt that in this passage 
the author "means the body of Christ; for as there was formerly an access for the Levitical 
high priest to the holy of holies through the sanctuary, so Christ through his own body 
entered into the glory of heaven" (Commentaries on the Epistle to the Hebrews, trans. John 
Owen [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19481, 202). Moreover, Calvin argues that "the word 
sanctuary is fitly and suitably applied to the body of Christ, for it is the temple in which the 
whole majesty of God dwells" (ibid.). In the following paragraph Calvin, rigorously 
applying the God principle to the interpretation of the text, explicitly explains that it does 
not refer to Christ's "material body, or of what belongs to the body as such, but of the 
spiritual efficacy which emanates from it to us. For as far as Christ's flesh is quickening, and 
is a heavenly food to nourish souls, as far as his blood is a spiritual drink and has a cleansing 
power, we are not to imagine anything earthly or material as being in them" (ibid., 203). 
figurative, or metaphorical interpretations. 
Thus, the philosophical interpretation of God, working as hermeneutical 
principle, requires the deconstruction of the literal meaning of the text. 
Specifically, the God and nature principles cannot accommodate the reality 
of the God-building-beings structure characteristic of sanctuary passages. 
Classical theology achieves this theological deconstruction of the biblical 
text by way of a metaphorical, ftgurative, or allegorical reconstruction beyond 
the meaning of the text itself. One end result of this process is the replacement 
of the God-building-beings structure of biblical texts with either a God or 
God-beings pattern akin to the spacelessness and timelessness of the God 
principle. 
5. Sanctuary and Modern Foundations 
Can we modify the philosophical foundations of Christian theology? 
Of course, we can. Not infrequently, new theological trends can be traced 
back to alterations in the understanding of philosophical foundations. In 
avery real sense modern theology results from Kant's adjustment of reason's 
role to the limits of space and time.'3 It can be argued that Kant's epistemological 
position is only a modification by limitation of the classical interpretation 
of the principle of reason" which leaves the classical timeless interpretation 
of God ~nchallen~ed. '~ 
Almost a century before Kant, we can find some traits of what will 
become the modern approach to theology in Baruch Spinoza. Spinoza's panen- 
43Kant concludes: "It is therefore not merely possible or probable, but indubitably 
certain, that Space and Time, as the necessary conditions of all our external and internal 
experience, are merely subjective conditions of all our intuitions, in relation to which all 
objects are therefore mere phenomena, and not things in themselves, presented to us in this 
particular manner. And for this reason, in respect to the form of phenomena, much may be 
said Li priori, while of the thing in itself, which may lie at the foundation of these 
phenomena, it is impossible to say anything" (Critique of Pure Reason, tr. J.M.D. 
Meiklejohn [Buffalo, NY: Prometheus, 19901, 39). Thus, Kant rejected the Aristotelic- 
Thomistic understanding of reason as "active intellect," able to reach timeless objects, and 
replaced it with his "transcendental reason" capable of reaching only spatio-temporal objects. 
&The principle of reason is another philosophical foundation of theology. In the 
classical tradition it was subsumed, as theory of knowledge, under the human nature 
principle. Modern philosophy, under Kantian leadership, addressed it as "criticism." In 
more recent times theologians have come to address the same philosophical issue under 
varied headings: for instance, epistemology and hermeneutics. 
45After careful analysis Kant feels that we may "determine our notion of the Supreme 
Being by means of the mere conception of the highest reality, as one, simple, all-sufficient, 
eternal, and so on-in one word, to determine it in its unconditioned completeness by the 
aid of every possible predicate. The conception of such a being is the conception of God in 
its transcendental sense, and thus the ideal of pure reason is the object-matter of a 
transcendental theology" (ibid., 325). 
theistic interpretation of the God principle* leads him to review the classical 
concept of revelation and inspiration of Scripture. Since all human beings 
know God directly through reason," and the necessary order of nature4* 
(God principle and Nature principle are identical), Spinoza believes that the 
activity of the prophet takes place in his imaginati~n.'~ Thus, the human 
locus of revelation-inspiration switches from reason to imagination. This 
momentous turn will become instrumental in the theological adoption of 
the historical-critical method of Bible interpretation, where miracle becomes 
a general term designating "any work whose cause is generally unknown,"50 
and historical narratives do not reveal God but "are very profitable in the 
matter of social  relation^."^^ Not surprisingly, Spinoza interprets the cere- 
monial observances of the OT as referring to the historical-social reality 
of the commonwealth of Israel." Moreover, the very content of biblical language 
on cultic ceremonies originates "only from contemporary custom.n53 
With time, the modern trend foreshadowed by Spinoza came to classify 
biblical thought under the category of myth. Early in the nineteenth century 
Ernst Cassirer described the nature of "myth" from a Kantian perspective 
as a consciousness that "knows nothing of certain distinctions which seem 
absolutely necessary to empirical-scientific thinking."% According to Cassirer, 
mythical thinking confuses "representation" with "realn perception, wish 
47Tractatus Theologico-Politicus, trans., by Samuel Shirley with intro. by Brad Gregory 
(Leiden: Brill, 1989), 70. 
49"God's revelations were received only with the aid of the imaginative faculty, to wit, 
with the aid of words or images, hence it was not a more perfect mind that was needed for 
the gift of prophecy, but a more lively imaginative facultyn (ibid., 65). 
52Due to his panentheism and revisionism of revelation and inspiration, Spinoza 
believed that "ceremonial observances served to strengthen and preserve the Jewish state" 
(ibid., 112). 
5'"Thus the Patriarchs sacrificed to God not through some command imposed on them 
by God, nor because they were instructed by the universal principles of the Divine Law, but 
only from contemporary custom. And if they did so by anyone's command, that command 
was simply the existing law of the commonwealth in which they were dwelling, by which 
they, too, were bound" (ibid., 116). 
%The Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 2, Mythical Thought, trans. Ralph Manheim 
(New Haven: Yale University Press, 1955), 36. 
with fulfillment, and images with things." Moreover, mythical thought "does 
not begin when the intuition of the universe and its parts and forces are merely 
formed into definite images, into the figures of demons and gods; it begins 
only when a genesis, a becoming, a l$i in time, is attributed to the~efi~ures."' 
Thus, myth, thinking of God in time and space, becomes another specific 
way to describe metaphorical thought. 
We have seen how the classical interpretation of the God principle rules 
out the notion that God may directly relate with space and time. Modern 
theology has not introduced significant changes in this regard. However, 
the decisive tilt toward historicity that, since the Enlighten-ment, has been 
taking place in some philosophical quarters (notably in historicism and pheno- 
menology) has moved philosophers and theologians to question the classical 
notion of God's absolute timelessness. Process Philosophy is a notable ex- 
ponent of this trend. 
Process Philosophy has not only criticized the notion of timelessness 
but has proposed a new view of God, according to which time and space 
become part of God's dipolar nature.57 However, this introduction takes 
place at the expense of replacing the personal notion of God's nature with 
a panentheistic one. How does the reinterpretation of the God principle 
proposed by Process Philosophy play when applied to the biblical sanctuary? 
Specifically, does the introduction of time in God's nature as proposed by 
Process Philosophy, recognize the God-building-beings structure of sanc- 
tuary texts? Not at all. Although Process Philosophy's revision of the God 
principle calls for the reinterpretation of major Christian doctrines," its appli- 
cation to the sanctuary requires the same metaphorical understandmg required 
by the classical view. One reason for this similarity is that in a panentheistic 
view of God, God becomes the place where beings exist.59 Therefore, God 
561bid., 104 (emphasis mine). Cassirer continues, "Only where man ceases to content 
himself with a static contemplation of the divine, where the divine explicates its existence 
and nature in time, where the human consciousness takes the step forward from the figure 
of the gods to the history, the narrative, of the gods-only then have we to do with 'myths' 
in the restricted, specific meaning of the word" (ibid). 
"Alfred N. Whitehead affirms that "the consequent nature of God is conscious; and 
it is the realization of the actual world in the unity of his nature" (Process and Reality: An 
Essay in Cosmology [New York: Macmillan, 19291,524). 
58Notably, the doctrine of God (cf. John J. O'Donnell, Trinity and Temporality: The 
Christian Doctrine of God in the Light of Process Theology and the Theology of Hope [Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 19831, 53-107). 
5Whitehead writes, "The actuality of God must also be understood as a multiplicity 
of actual components in process of creation. This is God in his function of kingdom of 
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cannot relate to beings from their outside but from their inside. God is the 
place of beings. Consequently, the God-building-beings structure essential 
to the biblical sanctuary must be taken to be God-beings. Specifically, the 
sanctuary as a building and the divine activities associated with it must be 
read metaphorically.60 
From the perspective of the new historical-exegetical approach to Biblical 
Studies originating in modern times, biblical literature on the sanctuary sheds 
some light on our understanding of OT and NT cultus and rituals because 
the sanctuary was obviously central to Israel's cultus. However, from the 
theological perspective of Christian dogmatics, the sanctuary continues to 
play no role. Theologically, the sanctuary becomes amyth because the biblical 
writings on the sanctuary attribute to God alife in time and space. Therefore, 
the sanctuary probably refers to human religious experience in the context 
of a panentheistic understanding of reality. 
Nevertheless, one should not forget that during the modern period the 
classical approach to the interpretation of the sanctuary continues exercising 
its influence not only on dogmatic interpretations but, at times, also on exegetical 
ones.61 Some exegetes, however, have begun to convey the meaning of sanctuary 
heaven. Each actuality in the temporal world has its reception into God's nature" (ibid., 
531). 
bOIn the next to the last paragraph of his Process and Reality Whitehead uses the word 
"heaven" as a metaphor for God's primordial nature: "What is done in the world is 
transformed into a reality in heaven, and the reality in heaven passes back into the world. 
By reason of this reciprocal relation, the love in the world passes into the love in heaven, and 
floods back again into the world" (ibid., 532). 
"Within the Protestant tradition, for instance, F. F. Bruce tells us that the heavenly 
sanctuary, the "'real sanctuary' belongs to the same order of being as the saint's everlasting 
rest of [Hebrews] chs. 3 and 4" (The Epistle to the Hebrews [Grand Rapids: Eerdmans, 19641, 
163). Since, according to Bruce, the order of being of the saint's everlasting rest is the 
immortality of the soul (ibid., 78-79), Platonic ontology still shows up playing its 
hermeneutical role. In my opinion, the same classical interpretation of the God principle is 
operative in his rejection of the historical understanding of the Atonement and the 
typological interpretation of the sanctuary (ibid, 200-201; fn. 82). From the Roman Catholic 
tradition, Aelred Cody goes a step further when he sees the Platonic interpretation of the 
God and nature principles working not from the reader's hermeneutic assumptions but from 
the author's: "The theology of the economy of salvation in Christ is presented by the 
Epistle's author in the form of a symbolic parable using the categories of Alexandrian 
dualism" (Heavenly Sanctuary and Liturgy in the Epistle to the Hebrews: i%e Achievement of 
Salvation in the Epistle's Perspectives [St. Meinrad, IN: Grail, 19601, 155). Norbert Huge& 
warns us against "me interpritation simpliste, qui ferait se figurer un Christ matiriellement 
assis B droite de Dieu le Pire, sur un tr6ne &or, comme on l'a w, h6las, par des 
reprbentations pieuses, coiff6 d'une couronne et revetu d'un manteau d'apparat" (Le 
Samrdoce du Fils: Commentaire & 1'6ph-e aux He'breux [Paris: Fischbacher, 19831,237-238). 
To help us avoid a naive reading of "Christ sitting at the right hand of God" (Heb 1:3; 8:l; 
10:12; and 12:2), Hugedt! quotes directly, in an authoritative manner, from the metaphorical 
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texts without calling on philosophical categories to interpret their referents." 
Tacitly, these exegetes replace the notion of a timeless-spaceless God with 
the biblical notion that the reality of God is free to relate personally and 
directly with time, history, and space." In so doing they implicitly point 
interpretations of Augustine and Aquinas (ibid., 238). 
62Walter C. Kaiser, Jr., understands the O T  tabernacle as primarily embodying the 
theology of worship. The sanctuary "assumes that God is the Great King who reigns and is 
therefore worthy of our praise and adoration. Even more specifically, the meaning of the 
tabernacle is that God has come 'to dwell,' 'to tabernacle' in the midst of Israel, as he would 
one day come in the Incarnation (John 1:14) and will come in the Second Advent (Rev 21:3). 
The Lord who dwelt in his visible glory in his sanctuary among his people (Exod 25:8) will 
one day come and dwell in all his glory among his saints forevern ( "Exodus," Expositor's 
Bible Commentary [Grand Rapids: Zondervan: 1973],2:452). William L. Lane recognizes 
that the word skengis used in Heb 8-9:10 "consistently in a local sense to designate the 
heavenly sanctuary (8:2) or the desert sanctuary (8:5), or to denote the front or rear 
compartments of the tabernacle (9:2, 3, 6,  8). The thrust of the argument is that the 
tabernacle with its division into two chambers was constructed according to the pattern or 
model shown to Moses on Mount Sinai (see on 8:5). The writer appears to have held a 
realistic understanding of Exod 25:40 and related texts, according to which a spatially 
conceived sanctuary consisting of two compartments existed in heaven and had provided the 
pattern for the desert sanctuary" (Hebrews 9-13, WBC, 47b [Dallas: Word, 19911,237-238). 
"Exegetical interpretations, however, do not, per se, inform theological discourse. 
Frequently, theologians summarily dismiss them as amusing possibilities that they, of 
course, cannot take seriously in the realm of dogmatic discourse. Biblical exegesis, after all, 
is supposed to fit the system dictated by the philosophical interpretation of theological 
principles. However, some less recognized and studied traditions seem to have entertained 
a more literal reading of the biblical sanctuary motif. For instance, according to Bryan W. 
Ball, seventeenth-century Puritan theology follows Aquinas' and Calvin's views regarding 
the interpretation of the O T  sanctuary as a metaphor of Christ's work (The English 
Connection: ?'he Puritan Roots of Seventh-day Adventist Belief [Cambridge: James Clarke, 
19811, 107-109). At the same time, however, his study seems to imply that, regarding the 
understanding of the heavenly sanctuary and Christ's ministry, an incipient departure from 
tradition begins to take place in some Puritan writers. On the one hand, Puritan theology 
seems to follow the classical approach. Ball summarizes his findings regarding the Puritan 
interpretation of the biblical heavenly sanctuary texts by saying that "it is only necessary to 
open the relevant literature at the appropriate pages to discover that Puritan writers saw no 
valid reason to depart from a literal interpretation of those passages of Scripture which 
referred to the existence of a sanctuary in heavenn (?'he English Connection, 110). Although 
some Puritan writers recognize that the "form and matter" of the heavenly sanctuary are "of 
a different kind than the "form and matter" of the earthly sanctuary, they still understand 
heavenly sanctuary texts as disclosing the reality of a building in heaven where Christ 
performs His ministry. Ball describes the Puritan view of the reahy of the heavenly 
sanctuary by saying that for Puritan writers "the heavenly sanctuary, real as it undoubtedly 
is, according to the clear testimony of Scripture, is of a far more excellent nature than its 
copy constructed on earth by men" (ibid.). The "matter and formn of the heavenly sanctuary 
"is of another kind, far more fair, pure, sublime, and stable than this which we see. And to 
this building pertains that heavenly tabernacle of Christ our high priest, which is the temple 
and residence of the Most High Godn (Thomas Lushington], The Expiation of a Sinner: In 
to the need of deconstructing the philosophical interpretation of God and 
its role as hermeneutical principle of theological discourse. 
Changes in the interpretation of the God principle necessarily involve 
substantial modifications in the understanding of the Being principle. What 
is the significance of this incipient and seemingly inconsequential departure 
from theological tradition? 
6. Sanctuary and Biblical Foundations 
Classical and modem foundations have consistently required 
a metaphorical interpretation of the God-building-beings structure present 
in the biblical texts that unveil the reality and meaning of the sanctuary. 
Working as hermeneutical principles, they have set the ontological stage 
to which the sanctuary refers. Apparently, the meaning of the God-building- 
beings sanctuary structure depends on the nature of its central component, 
God The understanding of the God principle, then, determines the ontological 
referent of sanctuary language. 
In sections 4 and 5 we have seen that when theologians embrace the 
timeless interpretation of the God principle, an unbridgeable incompatibility 
between the building (world principle) and the God components of the sanctuary 
structure takes place. The plain literal sense of sanctuary texts cannot be 
incorporated into theological discourse because God is assumed to exist in 
timelessness while the notion of bdding stands in time and space. Consequently, 
a metaphorical-figurative reading becomes imperative. The metaphorical 
sense applies, primarily, not to God or humans but to the sanctuary as building. 
By extension, however, the metaphorical sense reaches the whole God-bdding- 
beings structure of sanctuary texts both in OT andNT. Metaphorical approaches 
a Commentary upon the Epistk to the Hebrews (1646), 167; this work appears to be largely 
a translation from a Latin commentary on Hebrews by Johannes Crellius (1590-1633), 
quoted in Ball, The English Connection, 110). On the other hand, if Ball's assessment of 
Puritan theology is correct, some Puritan writers' views of Christ's postresurrection 
priestly ministry are closely related to their recognition of the God-building-beings structure 
of the sanctuary as a literal reality in heaven. For some Puritan writers Christ's heavenly 
ministry is no longer a metaphor pointing to his eternal salvific grace (Aquinas), or the 
spiritual efficacy of Christ's spiritual body (Calvin). Instead, they conceive Christ's 
postresurreaion heavenly ministry as a necessary continuation of his salvific activities 
initiated at the cross. Cross and heavenly ministries are consecutive, complementary salvific 
acts of Christ without which our salvation cannot be accomplished. "The death and blood 
of Christ is [sic] not enough to the cleansing of our souls, unless the blood be sprinkled, the 
death of Christ applied to us. There must be a work of application as well as of redemption. 
All the precious blood that Christ hath shed will not save a sinner, unless this blood be 
effectually applied and sprinkled on the soul. Application is a great and necessary part of our 
recovery and salvation, as well as the blood of Christ itself" (Samuel Mather, Figures or Types, 
318; quoted in Ball, 104). For further discussion and sources see Ball, 103-107. 
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to the sanctuary texts require a transpositionM of the building notion from 
its immediate spatietemporal setting to the realm of divine timeless eternity. 
Unfortunately, this transposition alters the God-building-beings structure 
to a buildingless God-beings relation. This way of interpreting sanctuary 
texts has the advantage of producing a coherent understanding, yet theolog- 
ical consistency is attained at the expense of dismissing substantial facets 
of the texts and the realities they illumine. 
Classical and modern theologies are right in insisting that our reading 
of the sanctuary texts be consistent and that consistency assumes that the 
subject matter about which the texts speak (the God-building-beings structure) 
stands on a unified understanding of reality. Theological interpretations of 
biblical texts, then, always assume a philosophical understanding of reality 
that they leave unthought and unsaid. Precisely because Scripture does not 
explicit$ address the interpretation of Being, God, human nature, and nature 
principles, theologians have consistently drawn their understanding of them 
from philosophy. 
Modernism and postmodernism have increasingly questioned the timeless 
view of classical theology. However, they have come short of abandoning 
the timelessness of God. They see classical timelessness as lacking proper 
balance as it relates to temporal historical realities. Consequently, modern 
and postmodernviews are inclined to correct this imbalance by introducing 
time into the notion of God.65 Methodologically, new interpretations are 
usually constructed by the free play of philosophical speculation and imagination. 
Is it possible to reach a theological understanding of the biblical sanctuary 
that, while mindful of conceptual consistency, may preserve the God-budding- 
beings structure essential to the subject matter uncovered by the texts? I think 
it is. I would like to suggest an alternate way to reach a consistent theological 
interpretation of the sanctuary, probably in harmony with some Puritan 
and some Biblical Theology readings of the sanctuary. A consistent theological 
interpretation of the sanctuary that does not require the metaphorical translation 
of its God-building-beings structure starts with the reinterpretation of the 
God principle. Such an alternateview requires two basic steps: the deconstruction 
of the classical and modern interpretations of the God principle and the selection 
of a starting point from which to think anew and formulate a reconstruction 
of the God principle in harmony with the biblical text. 
The starting point 
Is there another way to reinterpret the meaning of the God principle 
65Hegel takes the lead in this regard. Process philosophy is another example of this 
trend (see section 5). 
besides the free play of philosophical speculation and imagination? Regarding 
the understanding of God, are we bound by the imagination (reason)-silence 
alternative? Contrary to the opinion of most philosophers and theologians, 
Heidegger believed that on the question of God, philosophy must keep silent 
while nursing an expectant mood waiting for the revelation of God within 
the horizon of Being.66 In short, it seems that Heidegger thought that God 
should reveal himself just as Being does in the experience of Darein (concrete 
human existence). Theologians are supposed to wait for God to present himself 
against the background provided by the general principle of Being and then 
be to attune themselves to it. We may speculate why Heidegger 
did not develop a philosophical reflection on God." It seems reasonable to 
suspect that Heidegger did not develop an explicit philosophy on the being 
of God because he was unable to find a starting point where the being of 
God would present itself within the realm of Dasein. 
I have argued elsewhere that the starting point for the Christian interpretation 
of the God principle is Scripture? Throughout the history of Christian thinking, 
Exod 3:14-15 has been recognized as the locus classicus where the being of 
God is brought into language. After changes in interpretation, biblical exegesis 
has come to recognize that this text speaks of the presence of God in history 
66James L. Perotti's study on Heidegger's notion of the divine reports that Heidegger 
recognizes the existence of past disclosures of God but, since in the present time God does 
not reveal himself, philosophers must keep silence and an attitude of expectation for the 
future revelation of God. "In the essay, Das Ding, Heidegger cites three past manifestations 
of the divine: in the gods of ancient Greece, in the Jewish prophets, and in the sayings of 
Jesus. But these manifestations are no longer present to man; they are no longer meaningful 
to us, no longer capable of religious influence. Therefore, Heidegger is silent about these past 
manifestations; his thinking takes no account of them, i.e., is god-less" (Heuiegger on the 
Divine: The Thinker, The Poet, and God [Athens, OH: Ohio University Press, 1974],95). It 
is interesting to notice that Heidegger did not choose to seek the knowledge of God by way 
of analogy but through the more biblical revelatory approach. Unfortunately, his 
philosophical method required him to start from the revelation of God. Although God did 
not reveal himself to Heidegger, or for that matter to other humans in his time, he chose not 
to deny the possibility of the existence of God. On the contrary, he decided to wait for his 
revelation in the future. In an arbitrary way Heidegger thought some poets were closer to 
the divine or Holy than the philosophers. He himself speculated on the area of disclosure 
of the Holy by way of commenting on some poems written by Holderin. I see no 
intellectual hindrance to replacing the writings of poets with the writings of O T  and NT 
writers. Of course, I am willing to recognize the obvious limits of philosophy on the 
question of God. 
67A detailed study of the question of God in Heidegger's work has been produced by 
George Kovacs, The Question of God in Hezdegger's Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: 
Northwestern University Press, 1990). 
("A Criticism of Theological Reason, 285-387. 
but does not address the issue of his being." Yet, if we recognize that the 
text is disclosing in words the presence of God, we have found the necessary 
startingpoint for a philosophical reconstruction of the God principle. This 
startingpoint is, in the realm of theology, analogous to Daein as aphilosophical 
starting point in Heidegger's philosophy.70 Biblical texts bring to light the 
revelation of God's being in his historical presence.71 As biblical texts on 
'j9The tendency to &associate God's presence from his Being shows up, for instance, 
when Th. C. Vriezen comments on Exod 3:14-15. "In this name Yahweh reveals His Being 
only in its 'formal aspect' by speaking of His actual presence. This is not a real qualification 
of Yahweh's Being, for Yahweh does not mention His name; but at the same time He does 
more than this: He gives man the most solemn assurance of his presence. For him who 
understands this there is no more need to ask about His name. Taken in this way this word 
of God to Moses typifies as shortly and essentially as possible all that Israel believes and 
knows concerning God. This name Yahweh, thus taken to mean 'He who is' without any 
further qualification of His Being, is therefore of fundamental importance. God can only be 
denoted as the Real One according to the functional character of His Being, not in His Being 
itself" (An Outline of Old Testament Theology [Oxford: Basil, 19581,236). 
''The main difference between the approach I am suggesting and Heidegger's relates to 
the selection of the starting point for phenomenological reflection. Heidegger starts from 
Dasein as appearance; from Dasein he goes to the interpretation of the ground of Being; and 
from the ground of Being he interprets God. The movement of biblical intelligibility, 
which I suggest Christian theology should follow, is different. The starting point is not the 
appearance of Dasein but the appearance of God. It is only from the appearance of God that 
we can settle the issue of the Being principle and the interpretation of all philosophical 
foundations. 
71This starting point comes to light only when we place the traditional philosophical 
understanding of "appearancen in phenomenological epoche (see below, nn. 72 and 73). 
Heidegger provides a summary description of the traditional meaning of "appearancen we 
should discard by way of phenomenological bracketing. "At first sight [explains Heidegger], 
the distinction seems clear. Being and appearance means: the real in contradistinction to the 
unreal; the authentic over against the inauthentic" (An Introduction to Metaphysics, trans. 
Ralph Manheim [New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 19871, 98). This understanding 
originates with the Sophists and Plato, who declared appearance "to be mere appearance and 
this degraded. At the same time, being as zdea was exalted to a suprasensory realm. A chasm, 
chorismos, was created between the merely apparent essence here below and the real being, 
somewhere on high. In that chasm Christianity settled down, at the same time reinterpreting 
the lower as the created and the higher as the creator (ibid., 106). This notion of 
"appearance" was adopted by Christianity as a result of the classical interpretation of the 
God principle I described in sections 3 and 4. Heidegger has shown how, on the basis of 
early "Greek interpretation of being as physic, and only on this basis, both truth in the sense 
of unconcealrnent and appearance as a definite mode of emerging self-manifestation belong 
necessarily to being" (ibid., 109). Appearance, then, is the manifestation of being. This 
manifestation becomes the source of what shows itself in the phenomenon. Heidegger 
summarizes his view by concluding that 'phenomenon,' the showing-itself-in-itself, signifies 
a distinctive way in which something can be encountered. 'Appearance,' on the other hand, 
means a reference-relationship which is an entity in itself, and which is such that what does 
the 7.f-ng (or the announcing) can fulfil its possible function only if it shows itself in itself 
and is thus a 'phenomenon'" (Being and Time, 54). 
God articulate the meaning of his past, present, and future presence, the being 
of God is brought into the clearing of consciousness by way of thought and 
words. The real ontic presence of God in space and time becomes the ground 
for biblical reflection on his being and actions. Consequently, biblical texts 
open a new way from which to search for the meaning of the God principle. 
This way does not stand on the basis of philosophical speculation or imagination, 
but rather on the recognition that our own access to the Christian understanding 
of any being, including God, is a careful listening to the way in which they 
present themselves to us through the linguistic mediation of biblical writers. 
Once we come to the point of recognizing the philosophical import 
of biblical text, we are in a position to assess classical interpretations of the 
God principle. To do that we need to place all previous scientific interpretations 
of the God principle under Husserlian epoche,," that is, in methodological 
brackets. In other words, we should explicitly and systematically avoid using 
them while reflecting on the meaning of God opened before us by the original 
reflection on the Christian God.n As we do that, we will discover that biblical 
texts on God and on the sanctuary reveal that the God principle is compatible 
with our space, time, and history. On this basis, we should deconstruct the 
classical and modern understandings of the God principle and replace them 
721n search of the scientific foundations of philosophy in the tradition of Descartes, 
Husserl introduces the phenomenological methodology which includes epoche as the 
methodological "bracketing," or "disconnecting," of traditionally received teachings of 
sciences (Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology, trans. W .  R. Boyce Gibson 
[London: George Allen & Unwin, 19521,109). Thus, he writes that "all sciences which relate 
to this natural world, though they stand ever so.firm to me, though they fill me with 
wondering admiration, though I am far from any thought of objecting to them in the least 
degree, I disconnect them all, I muke absolutely no use of their standards, I do not appropriate 
a single one of the propositions that enter into their systems, even though their evidential value 
is pdect, I take none of them, no one of them serves mefor afoundution-so long, that is, as it 
is understood, in the way these sciences themselves understand it as a truth concerning the 
realities of this world. I muy accept it only after I haveplaced it in the bracket. That means: only 
in the modified consciousness of the judgment as it appears in disconnection, and not as it 
figures within the science as its proposition, a proposition which claims to be valid and whose 
validity I recognize and make use of" (ibid, 111). According to Husserl, "the 
phenomenological epoche includes all the sciences natural and mental, with the entire 
knowledge they have accumulated" (ibid., 171). See also Edmund Husserl, The Crisis of 
European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Evanston, IL: Northwestern 
University Press, WO), 135137. Emphasis original. 
"This is a methodological procedure similar to the one Heidegger's investigation of the 
meaning of the Being principle applied to the ontological tradition. Heidegger used a 
modified version of Husserl's phenomenological epoche not only to suspend judgment, but 
also to destroy (deconstruct) traditional ontology (Being and Time, 44,49). 
with a technical formulation of the biblical understanding of God. We should 
deal with the other philosophical principles in the same manner. 
The critical analysis of the theological understanding of philosophical 
principles I have briefly sketched becomes the methodological condition 
for overcoming the metaphorical interpretation of the sanctuary in Christian 
theology." As we recognize the hermeneutical role of philosophcal principles 
in Christian theology, and interpret them on the basis of biblical reflection, 
a consistent theological interpretation of the sanctuary that preserves its 
God-building-beings structure becomes possible. 
Z Summary and Conclusion 
Philosophical foundations relate to the biblical sanctuary motif because 
they play the role of hermeneutical principles operative in its theological 
interpretation. Among the philosophical principles called to p w  
role in Christian theology we identified the Being, God, human nature, and 
nature (the world) principles. Because in the biblical texts the sanctuary 
consistently reveals a God-building-beings structure, the God principle (in 
dose relation to the nature [world] principle) directly conditions its theological 
interpretation. Philosophical principles work, for instance, by determining 
the nature of the reality to which the biblical texts refer, thereby determining 
whether the passage addresses its subject matter in a plain literal or in a more 
imaginative metaphorical sense. In theology, metaphorical discourse is usually 
called to fit the parameters of reality dictated by the philosophcal interpretation 
of its subject matter. 
Classical and modem theological traditions, usually embracing the timeless 
view of the God principle originated by Parmenides and Plato, interpret 
the sanctuary metaphorically. The timelessness of God, which makes no 
room for the notion of building or the notion of a succession of divine actions, 
requires a metaphorical interpretation. Consequently, sanctuary texts cannot 
speak of God directly but only metaphorically. Thus, the metaphorical 
interpretation of the sanctuary involves a transposition of the historical and 
spatial c re understand in^ of the biblical texts to the timeless understanding 
dictated by the God principle. In the process, theologians are forced to 
achieve consistency by reducing the God-building-beings structure of the 
biblical texts to either a God-beings or a God structure of which the sanctuary 
texts can only speak metaphorically. 
I have argued that a critical approach to the interpretation of traditional 
philosophical principles may open an alternate way to interpret the biblical 
"Apparently, sanctuary texts assume that God is capable of relating directly to humans 
in a building. Specifically, the idea of God does not rule out his direct relational involvement 
with created beings within the limitations of space and time. 
sanctuary, to help us overcome the metaphorical approach. A theological 
view of the sanctuary texts that, while preserving theological consistency, 
will not be compelled to deny the God-building-beings structure of biblical 
thinking requires a reinterpretation of philosophical principles, particularly 
of the God principle. The possibility of reinterpreting the philosophical 
understanding of the God principle hinges on the existence and identification 
of a starting point for reflection. The starting point, fortunately, is given 
to us in the prescientific understanding of God's presence expressed in biblical 
thinking. When we recognize that biblical reflection on God simultaneously 
reveals not only his historical presence but also his being, aview of the God 
principle compatible with our space and time comes into view. We need 
only formulate that view in technical categories and use it as hermeneutical 
principle for the interpretation of the biblical sanctuary. This interpretation 
of the God principle eliminates what has forced classical and modern theologies 
to various metaphorical interpretations. 
